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RECENT DECISIONS
Evidence: Gelhaar v. State-Prior Inconsistent Statements-
In Gelhaar v. State,' the defendant appealed from a conviction for the
first-degree stabbing murder of her husband. During investigation, the
police had taken statements from the two Gelhaar children. In each
case the officer made notes while the child spoke. These statements indi-
cated that the defendant had made an unprovoked attack on her husband
and had expressed an intent to kill him. However, at the trial the de-
fendant called the children as her witnesses, and their testimony was
that the husband had called the defendant names and had threatened
her. Their testimony contained nothing which evidenced any intent of
the defendant to commit the murder. But when the two statements
which had been made by the children to the police were put into evi-
dence by the state, no objections were made, and no limiting instructions
were given by the court or requested by the defendant. On appeal, the
defendant attacked the order denying her motion for a new trial, alleg-
ing that prior inconsistent statements of witnesses are not competent
evidence and that the evidence was insufficient to justify a verdict of
first degree murder.
The defendant's argument was based on the holding in State v.
Maior that prior inconsistent statements of a non-party witness would
be admitted into evidence for purposes of impeachment only. Ths had
been the rule in Wisconsin 3 and is the rule in the majority of American
jurisdictions.4 Such statements were not competent as substantive evi-
dence and a party failed if he relied on them to prove his case. The prior
statement was admitted by the court, if admissible on other grounds,
together with any contrary testimony given during the trial, and both
were given to the jury. The jury was then instructed that the prior
statement was to be disregarded for any purpose other than to test the
witness' credibility.5
The effect of the testimony was to challenge credibility rather than
to establish "contradiction" or, as it is sometimes termed, "specific
error." Contradiction is based on the theory that one of the statements
is false and the other true6 and that the witness is lying. Credibility
means that the witness "blows hot and cold." He is unreliable because
he cannot make a definitive statement. Therefore, in deciding against
141 Wis. 2d 230, 163 N.W.2d 609 (1969).
2274 Wis. 110, 79 N.W.2d 75 (1956). See also 41 MTARQ. L. REV. 317 (1958).
3 Jaster v. Miller, 269 Wis. 223, 69 N.V.2d 265 (1955); Hamilton v. Reine-
mann, 233 Wis. 572, 290 N.W. 194 (1940) ; Hilton v. Hayes, 154 Wis. 27,
141 N.W. 1015 (1913).
4Annot., 133 A.L.R. 1454 (1941). See also Annot., 74 A.L.R. 1042 (1931);
Annot., 117 A.L.R. 326 (1938) ; 58 Aar. TUR. WITNESSES § 770 (1948).
State v. Major, 274 Wis. 110, 79 N.W.2d 75 (1956).
6 C. MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE § 47, at 100 (1954) [hereinafter cited as MCCOR-
MICK].
RECENT DECISIONS
the witness' credibility, the trier of fact does not first decide whether
either of the inconsistent statements is true, but only whether the wit-
ness is unreliable and whether or not his testimony is to be completely
discounted. The office of the prior statement under the majority rule
is only to negative or neutralize the testimony to which it is directed.7
Prior inconsistent statements by a witness who was a party to the
action and by a hostile witness are not covered by this rule. The prior
statement of a witness who is a party to the action has long been given
substantive value under the exception to the hearsay rule allowing ad-
missions and declarations against interest.8 The hostile witness, on the
other hand, was protected from any use of the prior statement by the
common law rule against impeaching one's own witness, so that the
prior statement was not admissible at all.9 The legislature, however,
abrogated the ancient proscription against impeaching-one's own witness
in criminal cases by enacting what is now Wisconsin Statute section
885.35 (1969)."O The statute allows the impeachment of the hostile wit-
ness, at the discretion of the court. Malone v. State" indicates that the
test for invocation of the statute is that surprise be shown.
The objections to the admission of the prior inconsistent statement
have arisen chiefly from its hearsay nature. The witness' original state-
ment is uttered free from the sanctions of any oath and is not given for
the record in the solemnity of a judicial proceeding. 2 The cross-exam-
ination does not take place at the time of the statement, and the judge
and the jury do not have the opportunity of observing the demeanor of
the witness when he makes the statement.'3 Fears have also been ex-
pressed that to give prior self-contradictions probative value would in-
crease the temptation and opportunity for the manufacture of evidence.' 4
In Gelhaar, the Wisconsin Supreme Court expressly overruled pre-
vious cases to the contrary and adopted the rule that the jury should be
able to consider prior inconsistent statements of an adverse witness as
7 Id. § 34.8 98 C.J.S. %AITNESSES § 628 (1957).
RId. § 477. See also J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 896 (3d ed. 1940) [hereinafter cited
as WIGMORE].
1
0 WIS. STAT. § 885.35 (1967): "HOSTILE WITNESS IN CRIMINAL CASES.
Where the testimony of a witness on the trial in a criminal action is incon-
sistent with a statement previously made by him and reduced to writing and
approved by him or taken by a phonographic reporter, he may, in the dis-
cretion of the court, be regarded as a hostile -witness and examined as an
adverse witness, and the party producing him may impeach by evidence of
such prior contradictory statement."
11 192 Wis. 379, 212 N.W. 879 (1927). But see Rice v. State, 37 Wis. 2d 392, 155
N.W.2d 116 (1967), in which the state was not required to show surprise.
12'State v. Saporen, 205 Minn. 358, 285 N.W. 898 (1939); Annot., 133 A.L.R.
1466 (1941).
1341 MARQ2. L. REV. 320 (1958).
'UState v. Saporen, 205 Minn. 358, 285 N.W. 898 (1939) ; 41 MARQ. L. REV. 320(1958). This problem is further discussed in J. MAGUIRE, COMON SENSE AND
COMMON LAW, 59-62 (1947).
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substantive evidence. 15 The court upheld the use of the prior inconsistent
statements of the children as proof of intent.
The court felt that the rule should not be adopted without limitation
and modified it in accord with the version suggested by McCormick:
A statement made on a former occasion by a declarant having
an opportunity to observe the facts stated, will be received as
evidence of such facts, notwithstanding the rule against hearsay
if
(1) the statement is proved to have been written or signed by
declarant, or to have been given by him as testimony in a judicial
or official hearing, or the making of the statement is acknowledged
by the declarant in his testimony in the present proceeding, and
(2) the party against whom the statement is offered is afforded
an opportunity to cross-examine the declarant. 16
A third condition was added by the court: that the witness has testi-
fied to the same events in a contrary manner in the present proceed-
ings. 7
The court further stated that the new rule applies only to the im-
peachment of an opposing party's witness. It was stated that Wisconsin
Statute section 885.35 (1969), as interpreted by the court in State v.
Major, does not permit the introduction of a hostile witness' statement
as substantive evidence in a criminal case and, while no statute forbids
it in civil cases, the court declined at this time to extend the new rule to
cover that situation. 8 The rule was also limited to prior inconsistent
statements. The court stated that it felt prior consistent, or self-serving,
statements do not have the same evidentiary value as prior consistent
statements and that such evidence is already before the jury as sub-
stantive evidence.' 9 The first reason, however, appears to be rather arbi-
trary and merely a statement of personal preference. The second does
not take into account the effect of a repetition on the weight ascribed to
the evidence by the jury, especially when a prior inconsistent statement
has already been introduced to call a witness' testimony into question.
The court, in deciding on the new rule, was influenced by the rea-
soning of McCormick 20 and Wigmore.21 This reasoning proceeds from
the premise that the only ground for denying to prior self-contradictions
any affirmative testimonial value is the hearsay rule. An extrajudicial
1541 Wis. 2d 230, 163 N.W.2d 609 (1969), citing State v. Major, 274 Wis. 110,
79 N.W.2d 75 (1956) ; Jaster v. Miller, 269 Wis. 223, 69 N.W.2d 265 (1955) ;
Hamilton v. Reinemann, 233 Wis. 572, 290 N.W. 194 (1940). Strictly speaking,
State v. Major was not overruled in Gelhaar since the witness in Major was
a hostile one. It is likely that the Gelhaar result would have been reached in
Major, had the rules enunciated in Gelhaar been applied.
16 McCoRMICK § 39, at 82.
1741 Wis. 2d at 241, 163 N.W.2d at 614.
s Id. at 242 n.4, 163 N.W.2d at 615.
19 Id. at 242, 163 N.W2d at 614.2 0 MCCORMICK § 39, at 75-76.
21 WAfIGMORE § 1018, at 687-88.
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statement must be rejected under Wigmore's hearsay theory because it
is made outside the courtroom by an absent person not subject to cross-
examination. But in the case of a prior statement by a witness, however,
the purpose of the hearsay rule is satisfied; if the witness is present and
subject to cross-examination, an ample opportunity exists to test the
witness as to the basis of former statements. A second argument given
for admission of a witness' prior inconsistent statement is that the
statement is nearer in time to the event than is the testimony. The
greater the lapse of time between the event and the trial, the greater the
chance of the witness' exposure to the dangers of distorted memory,
corruption, false suggestion, intimidation, or appeal to sympathy. "[T] he
time-element plays an important part, always favoring the earlier state-
ment, in respect to all of these hazards."' The court's final reason for
its change was that the attempt to instruct the jury to consider the evi-
dence solely as bearing on the credibility of the witness is simply in-
effectual'and a "mere verbal ritual.
23
The new rule is consistent with changes long advocated by schol-
ars. However, it is much more restricted in application than most of the
scholastic approaches and is limited in effect to the exact situation found
in Gelluar. The ALI suggested a fairly unrestricted rule24 and this rule
was adopted in rule 63(1) of the Uniform Rules of Evidence.2 5 Both
rules advocate that all prior statements be accorded full value as an
exception to the hearsay rule if the witness is subject to cross-examina-
tion. The Preliminary Draft of Proposed Rules of Evidence for the
United States District Courts and Magistrates takes a slightly different
approach in achieving substantially the same end by excluding such
statements from its initial definition of hearsay.26 It does limit the rule
22 McCoRMICK § 39, at 75.
23 Id. at 77.
24 MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE rule 503 (1942) : "Evidence of a hearsay declaration
is admissible if the judge finds that the declarant (a) is unavailable as a
witness, or (b) is present and subject to cross-examination."25 UNIoRM RULES OF EVIDENCE rule 63(1) (1954): "HEARSAY EVIDENCE Ex-
CLuED-ExcE-TIoNs. Evidence of a statement which is made other than by a
witness while testifying at the hearing offered to prove the truth of the matter
stated is hearsay evidence and inadmissible except: (1) Previous statements
of a person subject to cross-examination. A statement previously made by
a person who is present at the hearing and available for cross-examination
with respect to the statement and its subject matter, provided the statement
would be admissible if made by the declarant while testifying as a wit-
ness ....
26 Coifs1. ON RULES OF PRACTICE AND PROCEDURES OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE
OF THE UNITED STATES, PRELIMINARY DRAFT OF PRoPosED RULES OF EVIDENCE
FOR THE UNIM STATES DisTRIcr COURTS AND MAGISTRATES rule 8-01 (c) (2) (i)
and (ii) (1959) [hereinafter cited as PRELIMINARY DRAFT]:
8-01 DEFINITIONS.
S(c) HEARSAY. "Hearsay" is a statement, offered in evidence to prove
the truth of the matter asserted, unless
(2) PIuOR STATEMENT BY WrrN ss. The declarant testifies at
1969-701
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by narrowing its application of the prior consistent statement to reha-
bilitation. The McCormick rule is even narrower in its requirement of
adoption by the witness: the statement must be written or signed by the
witness, given in a prior judicial proceeding, or acknowledged by him.
The Wisconsin Court requires further that the statement be offered to
contradict present testimony.27
It might be said that, under the new Wisconsin rule, the evidence
involved is now offered under the theory of "contradiction" rather than
a testing of "credibility". Before Geltaar, the jury purportedly used such
evidence to decide whether the witness' testimony on the stand was reli-
able or unreliable; now such evidence has a dual role, and the jury can
also decide which of the two stories is true.
While there has been widespread support among academic writers
for this enlargement of the exceptions to the hearsay rule to give a
probative effect to prior inconsistent statements of a witness,2 the courts
have largely rejected such a stand.2 9 With the exceptions of the United
States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit ° and Wisconsin, no
American court has approved such a rule. The California legislature
enacted a similar rule in its Evidence Code,31 and Kansas,- in adopting
a modified version of the Uniform Rules, also endorsed such usage.
California, in applying its statute33 which allowed substantive value
to prior inconsistent statements, experienced some problems which
were not considered by the Wisconsin court in its discussion of Gelhaar.
In People v. Johnson,3 4 it was decided that, in criminal cases, the Cali-
fornia statute was a violation of the defendant's constitutional rights.
The court held the right to confrontation guaranteed by the Sixth
Amendment was not satisfied unless the accused was given the oppor-
tunity to cross-examine at the time the statement was made and before
the trial or hearing and is subject to cross-examination concern-
ing the statement, and the statement is (i) inconsistent with his
testimony, or (ii) consistent with his testimony and is offered to
rebut an express or implied charge against him of recent fabrica-
tion or improper influence or motive ....
27 McCORMICK § 39, at 82.
28V WIGMORE § 1018: McCoRMICK § 39; Morgan, The Hearsay Dangers and the
Application of the Hearsay Concept, 62 HARV. L. REV. 177. 192-96 (1948);
UNIFORM RULES OF EVIDENCE rule 63(1) (1954); MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE
rule 503(b) (1942) ; PRELIMINARY DRAFT rule 8-01(c) (2) (i) and (ii) ; see
also DiCarlo v. United States, 6 F.2d 364 (2d Cir. 1925), cert. denied, 268
U.S. 706 (1925).
29 Annot., 133 A.L.R. 1454 (1941). See also Annot., 74 A.L.R. 1042 (1931); An-
not., 117 A.L.R. 326 (1938); 58 Am. JUR. WITNESSES § 770 (1948).
30 United States ex rel. Ng Kee Wong v. Corsi, 65 F.2d 564 (2d Cir. 1933);
United States v. De Sisto, 329 F.2d 929, 932-34 (2d Cir. 1964).
31 CAL. EVlD. CODE § 1235 (West 1966).
32 KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-640 (1964).
33 See Miller, Beyond the Law of Evidence, 40 S. CAL. L. REV. 1 (1967).
3468 Cal. Rptr. 599, 441 P.2d 111 (Sup. Ct. 1968). See also People v. Graham,
78 Cal. Rptr. 217, 455 P.2d 153 (1969).
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a contemporaneous trier of fact. 5 The United States Court of Appeals
for the Eighth Circuit in a recent decision seems to agree:
The Ellis case was decided in 1943. Almost a quarter of a cen-
tury later the empirical judgment of all courts, both state and
federal, still follows the orthodox view, contrary to the liberal
suggestions early espoused by Dean Wigmore. (See Wigmore,
section 1018 (3rd ed Supp 1964).) The right to confront the
witness at the time the statements are made is paramount in
a criminal trial. U.S. Const. Amend. VI.38
The Sixth Amendment occupies much of the same ground as the
hearsay rule3 7 and the right to cross-examination is a facet of the right
to confrontation guaranteed by this amendment. The passage of time
and the altered circumstances since the witness' prior declaration may
make the subsequent cross-examination inadequate. The question of
what constitutes a cross-examination adequate to give the defendant his
constitutional right of confrontation presents a potential problem for
Wisconsin in its application of the Gelhaar rule.
HERBERT V. ADAMS
Attorneys: Scrivener as Beneficiary of Will--"An attorney has
a duty not to harm but to maintain the integrity of the legal profession,
even though this may call for a personal sacrifice . . . ."' This duty to
the profession may become onerous when a problem arises concerning
a will in which the attorney-draftsman is named as a beneficiary. In
such a situation, the attorney not only risks undermining public trust
in the integrity of the legal profession but also chances a charge of
conflict of interest. He may also render himself incompetent to testify
about the will because of a "dead man's statute." The most serious
risk is that the will will be invalidated if contested, an especially harsh
result in jurisdictions, including Wisconsin, which do not follow the
rule of partial will invalidity in undue influence cases.2
In State v. Collentine,3 the Wisconsin Supreme Court addressed
itself to the problem and, exercising its supervisory authority over the
Bar, promulgated the following rule:
In order to prevent future misunderstandings, we conclude
and establish as a rule for prospective application that a lawyer
35 The California court pointed out that the United States Supreme Court has
been zealous in protecting Sixth Amendment rights from erosion. Smith v.
Illinois, 390 U.S. 129 (1967); Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965) ; Bridges
v. Wixon, 326 U.S. 135 (1945).
3 Goings v. United States, 377 F.2d 753, 762 n.12 (8th Cir. 1967).
3 PRELIMINARY DRAF-r Art. VIII [Hearsay, Confrontation, and Due Process],
at pp. 156-58.
'State v. Horan, 21 Wis. 2d 66, 70, 123 N.W.2d 488, 490 (1963).
2 Id.
5 39 Wis. 2d 325, 159 N.W.2d 50 (1968).
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